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Background: Many Low-and-Middle-Income countries are considering reviewing their health financing systems to
meet the principles of Universal Health Coverage (UHC). One financing mechanism, which has dominated UHC
reforms, is the development of health insurance schemes. We trace the historical development of the National
Health Insurance (NHI) policy, illuminate stakeholders’ perceptions on the design to inform future development of
health financing policies in Kenya.
Methods: We conducted a retrospective policy analysis of the development of a NHI policy in Kenya using data
from document reviews and seven in depth interviews with key stakeholders involved in the NHI design. Analysis
was conducted using a thematic framework.
Results: The design of a NHI scheme was marked by complex interaction of the actor’s understanding of the
design, proposed implementation strategies and the covert opposition of the reform due to several reasons. First,
actor’s perception of the cost of the NHI design and its implication to the economy generated opposition. This was
due to inadequate communication strategies to articulate the policy, leading to a vacuum of factual information
flow to various players. Secondly, perceived fear of implications of the changes among private sector players
threatened support and success gained. Thirdly, underlying mistrust associated with perceived lack of government’s
commitment towards transparency and good governance affected active engagement of all key players
dampening the spirit of collective bargain breeding opposition. Finally, some international actors perceived a clash
of their role and that of international programs based on vertical approaches that were inherent in the health
system.
Conclusion: The thrust towards UHC using NHI schemes should not only focus on the design of a viable NHI
package but should also involve stakeholder engagements, devise ways of improving the health care system,
enhance transparency and develop adequate governance structures to institutions mandated to provide leadership
in the reform process to overcome covert opposition.
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Universal Health Coverage (UHC) currently dominates
the global policy agenda. Governments and policy
makers are considering how to review their health finan-
cing systems to make progress to UHC. The 58th World
Health Assembly urged member states to ensure that
“health-financing systems introduce prepayment mecha-
nisms for the health sector, with a view to sharing risk,
avoid catastrophic health-care expenditure and impover-
ishment of individuals as a result of seeking care” [1].
The 2010 World Health Report identified the important
role of health financing in achieving universal health
coverage (UHC) [2], while the 2013 WHO report was
dedicated to UHC, the idea is being considered as one of
the health system goals post 2015, when the millennium
development goals come to an end.
Health care financing has three interrelated functions
namely: revenue collection, pooling and purchasing [3].
Revenue collection is the process by which health sys-
tems receive money from households and organizations.
Pooling is the accumulation and management of reve-
nues to ensure that the risk of paying for health care is
borne by all the members of the pool and not by individ-
ual contributor [4,5]. Purchasing is the process by which
pooled funds are paid to providers in order to deliver a
set of health interventions on behalf of the population
for which the funds are pooled [4]. Recent policy discus-
sions have focused on how to restructure these functions
to ensure that health systems in Low-and-Middle-In-
come Countries (LMICs) are primarily funded through
prepayment mechanisms that allow for risk pooling and
income cross-subsidization.
Health systems in many LMICs have been primarily
funded through out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. OOP pay-
ments are a major barrier to access; they promote inequi-
ties and contribute towards household poverty [6-10].
These concerns have led to a shift in policy debates, away
from OOP payments as the main sources of health care
funds, towards prepayment mechanisms, including tax
funding and/or health insurance contributions [11]. Health
insurance has gained popularity over tax funding, particu-
larly in Africa because tax driven health systems in devel-
oping countries face challenges of a small formal sector,
low institutional capacity to collect taxes and a lack of tax
compliance. Health insurance schemes, it is argued, have
fewer difficulties in identifying their members, in collecting
their contributions and their benefits and are said to be
more visible and linked to contributions. Health insurance
protects individuals incurring high costs at the time of ill-
ness, thereby promoting access to health care, particularly
in settings where the government subsidizes premiums for
the poorest population. Consequently, health insurance is
potentially being viewed as a mechanism for overcoming
existing structural inequities in Africa [1,12,13].Kenya is one of the few African countries that have had
a national hospital insurance scheme in existence since
the 1960s. Membership to the National Hospital Insurance
Fund (NHIF) is mandatory for all Kenyans in formal em-
ployment and voluntary for those in the informal sector.
The NHIF has been criticized for poor quality of care in
accredited facilities, a cumbersome claiming process and
location of offices in urban areas where the minority of
the population live [14]. To address some of these con-
cerns, the country is currently considering introducing a
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), which will
include transforming the NHIF to cover all Kenyans, for
both outpatient and inpatient services irrespective of their
ability to pay. Under the new arrangement, the NHIF will
be reformed and will purchase comprehensive health in-
surance for all Kenyans.
The NHIS proposal, developed in 2004/2005 drew at-
tention both locally and internationally but was met with
resistance from various stakeholders. The NHIS Bill was
highly controversial; it was nevertheless passed in parlia-
ment, but the president declined to sign it due to a mix
of both technical and political reasons. Discussions on
the NHIS were initiated again in 2007 and a draft health
financing strategy was developed in 2009 to guide the
country towards UHC. The strategy has not been final-
ized, implementation of UHC reforms has been relatively
slow and it remains uncertain when the country will
adopt a NHIS.
As the country continues to search for a UHC solution,
a major concern is whether the NHIS is the most appro-
priate financing mechanism for Kenya, how such a mech-
anism should be designed and how to make it acceptable
to stakeholders. Since stakeholders are key in any policy
change; their preferences and interests can hinder policy
formulation and implementation. A better understanding
of stakeholders’ views and opinions regarding the NHIS
design is important for future implementation. This paper
traces the historical process of the development of the
NHIS proposal and illuminates factors that led to the fail-
ure of implementing the policy using policy analysis tech-
niques. Stakeholder’s views on the design are documented
and lessons drawn to inform future development of health
financing policies in Kenya.
Methods
We conducted a retrospective policy analysis of the devel-
opment of NHIS policy in Kenya. We assess actor’s per-
ception on the NHIS design and examine factors leading
to failure to implement the proposed reform strategy.
Data collection
Data were obtained from various document reviews using
a template which summarized details of the government
documents, content and relevance, goals and objectives of
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process. The review also analyzed type and roles of actors
involved in the design. The key outputs of document re-
view were organized into: documents reviewed and their
relevance, historical context of the policy development, list
of actors and their roles and implementation milestones.
Documents reviewed are presented in Table 1.
The gaps identified from the review were clarified dur-
ing in-depth interviews conducted with seven different
stakeholders in 2010. In-depth interviews provided an op-
portunity for detailed understanding of actor’s role in the
policy making process, their perceptions of design and fac-
tors that may have necessitated failure to implement the
policy. Some actors were no longer based in the participat-
ing institutions, in which case efforts were made to con-
tact them because they were in a better position to discuss
the study issues. Stakeholders were drawn from organiza-
tions including economists in the Ministries of Finance
and Health, World Health Organization (WHO) country
office, private health insurance companies, representatives
from an umbrella body of Non-government organizations,
and representative from development partners.
The topics covered included opinions on the NHIS
policy process; health financing context; and stakeholders
engaged in health care financing. Also explored were
stakeholder’s perceptions on the health insurance design.
Finally, views were sought on the actor’s opinions on the
historical process of the NHIS policy development and the
factors that led to the failed implementation. Where ac-
tors’ opinions differed with data reviewed from docu-
ments, clarifications were sought.
In-depth interviews were recorded (where consent was
given) and detailed notes taken for those individuals who
did not consent to recording. All interviews were tran-
scribed and typed into Microsoft Word software. Informal
analysis was conducted and summaries of the collected
data made after each session for clarification or follow up.
The data were stored and managed using QSR Nvivo 10
Software (© QSR international Pty 2007, Australia).
Data analysis
A list of themes was developed from the desk review
and later a complete thematic framework was developed
as transcripts were examined. Analysis charts were then
developed based on the policy analysis framework. Final
analysis was organized around a description of the his-
torical account on the development of the NHIS, role of
actors and their influences, factors that led to the failed
implementation.
Ethical approvals were granted by the Kenya Medical
Research Institute (KEMRI) Ethics and Research Com-
mittee (Protocol number 1609). Written informed con-
sent was obtained from all the interviewees. To maintain
anonymity in reporting a set of broad actor groups areused to indicate the perspective of the information with-
out linking to a particular actor.
Results
Historical account of NHIS in Kenya
A number of financing policies have been developed to
guide the provision of effective and accessible healthcare
based on the foundations of solidarity, responsibility,
equity and transparency. Table 2 outlines the milestones
towards the development of a NHIS in Kenya. Between
1965 and 1989 health care was financed through tax-
ation in line with its policy of free medical care as envis-
aged in the Sessional paper 1 [15]. However, health care
financing policies failed to enable Kenyans to access
quality and affordable health care:
“We realized that people are not accessing health,
because of financial barriers. And health is putting
about 1.5% of households below the poverty line. So
we asked ourselves, ‘what is the best way forward?’
and in time to answer that question, we thought the
best approach is for us to develop a financing strategy
whose primary focus would be to tap the high out-
of-pocket expenditure in an organized prepayment
arrangement. That is how the debate of social health
insurance came in and we prepared the sessional
paper” (MoH actor).
The proposed health insurance reforms were contained
in the Sessional paper No. 2 of 2004 on the NHIS in
Kenya [15]. The reforms sought to transform the NHIF
into an NHIS. The genesis of a NHIS system was hatched
in 2001. A taskforce was formed and consultations held in
15 districts across Kenya whose report recommended an
NHIS [16]. In May 2002, an inter-sectoral task force was
established to prepare a national strategy and legislation of
Kenya’s NHIS. In June 2003, the MoH approached GTZ
and WHO for technical support on setting up of a NHIS.
Subsequent to the inter-sectoral task force report, six ex-
pert missions were set up to support the process [17].
The expert missions met between June 2003 to June
2004 and were responsible for various activities [16]:
 The 1st mission conducted in June 2003 was
responsible for reviewing the NHIS strategy paper,
drafting the bill and the Sessional Paper number 2
on NHIS. Key recommendations raised by this
mission was the need for a proper costing of the
benefit package; having registration fees structured
by levels of care to prevent overutilization; initial
exclusion of long term illness; cost containment
through quality management; mortuary charges
limited to three days; and special review procedures
for expensive drugs.
Table 1 List of documents reviewed
National reports and strategic proposals
NSHI strategy: Comments and Suggestions of the Joint WHO/GTZ mission on Social Health Insurance
in Kenya (1st Mission) WHO/GTZ, June, 2003
NSHI strategy: Comments and Suggestions of the Joint WHO/GTZ mission on Social Health Insurance
in Kenya (2nd mission) WHO/GTZ August, 2003
NSHI strategy: Key findings and prerequisites for implementation (3rd mission) WHO/GTZ/KfW Germany
December, 2003
NSHI strategy: Progress review and recommendations (4th Mission) WHO/GTZ/DFID January 2004
Progress review of the initial implementation stage and recommendations (5th mission) Joint WHO –
GTZ – DFID – ILO Mission to Kenya 29th March to 2nd April 2004
Sessional paper No 2 on National Social Health Insurance in Kenya in Kenya May 2004
The National Social Health Insurance Fund Bill, 2004
Presentation by Amit Thakker CEO 2004. Avenue group in the informal session with stakeholders
Financial projections and future bilateral/multilateral cooperation (6th Mission) WHO/GTZ mission_21st
to 26th June, 2004
Carrin et al 2007 health financing reform in Kenya-assessing the social health insurance proposal
IPAR 2005, Social Health Insurance Scheme for All Kenyans: Opportunities and Sustainability Potential
IPAR policy Brief Volume11, Issue 2, 2005
WHO 2006: Health financing reform in Kenya: assessing the social health insurance proposal
MOPHS & MOMS March 2009, Towards a Health Financing Strategy for Kenya
Nzoya Munguti, 2006, Review of Social Health Insurance in Kenya November 2006
Documents from International meetings
Opening of the International GTZ-ILO-WHO Conference on Social Health Insurance in Developing
Countries Berlin, 5, 2005
Social health insurance and its role in economic development and poverty reduction Inaugural
Address by Mr. David Fuentes-Montero, Minister of Finance from the Republic of Costa Rica, in
Central America
The inclusion of the poor in social health insurance framework: the strategies applied in viet nam
By Dr Tran Van Tien during The international Conference on Social Health Insurance in Developing
Countries Berlin 5;– 7 December, 2005
International Conference on Social Health Insurance in Developing Countries by Julio Frenk et al, 2005
GTZ-ILO–WHO International Conference “Social Health Insurance in Developing Countries” Trends in
health sector reform in Latin America in the 90’s and challenges for social protection in health in the
21st century by Eduardo Levcovitz
Social health insurance: Social security and HIV/AIDS The experience of the National Social Security
Fund by David Lambert Tumwesigye, Lusaka, Zambia, 9-12 August 2005
Newspaper cuttings
Health Matters: Plan to increase deductions by insurer continue to draw anger from workers: Daily
Nation 17th Aug, 2010 pg 11: “Civil servants reject NHIF dues
Growing pains: Even as Government improves healthcare, questions emerge over financing Daily
nation 17th Aug, 2010 smart company pg 10: “The poor will finance the rich in the new medical plan
Medical Care: Sunday nation 20th June 2010 pg 4: hospital fund contribution to rise by 600 p.c
Healthcare; Insured workers feel the pain as high premiums end up on payslips Daily nation 27th July
2010 smart company pg 10: “Rising medical bill a bitter pill for employers
Advertising feature: Daily Nation 27th July 2010 pg 36: “The Evolution of NHIF”
Medical fees row; setback for national health insurer: Daily nation 11th Aug, 2010: Bid to block new
NHIF rates certified ‘urgent
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focused on the legal aspects of the NHIS Bill, the
benefit package and provider payments, the
transition of the current NHIF into the NHIS andthe implementation tasks. Key recommendations
from this technical mission was the need to improve
the NHIF image, which had a history of inefficiency
and corruption, by promoting transparency and
Table 2 Key milestones towards NHI in Kenya
Period key activities/outputs
1965 ✓ Sessional paper no 10 on “African Socialism and its
application in Kenya” which outlined plans to provide
welfare on a large scale. Government waived KES 5.00
charged to people
1966 ✓ Creation of the NHIF through an act of parliament
to replace the existing racially discriminative scheme
by providing a contributory hospital based cover for
all Kenyans aged over 18 years in formal employment
and earning over Kshs 1,000.
1970 ✓ Failure of local services to offer satisfactory services
led to transfer of services to central government but
no extra fund to meet the extra costs
1972 ✓ Voluntary NHIF membership was introduced to
bring on board the informal sector and those earning
less than Kshs 1,000.
1986 ✓ Sessional paper No. 1 of 1986 on “Economic
Management for renewed growth”. Outlining
Government priorities relating to financing of health
care services including strengthening of NHIF and
introduction of cost sharing in public health facilities.
1989 ✓ The cost sharing policy introduced in the public
health sector (user fees) to mobilize additional
resources in the health sector, reduce excessive use
of resources and improve the functioning of the
referral system
1990 ✓ Review of NHIF contribution premium rates having
stagnated at Kshs 20 since inception of the fund to
offset the impact of inflation and raising health care
costs and also to generate additional resources
towards financing of health care services
✓ temporary suspension of user fees
1992 ✓ Reintroduction of modest user fees
1994 ✓ Cabinet approved the Kenya Health Policy
Framework a blue print for priorities in health care
✓Review of the NHIF from being a Government
department within the ministry of health into a state
corporation, through Act of parliament
November 2001 ✓ First national congress on quality improvement
in health medical research and traditional medicine
✓ President directed ministers to take action on
measures to establish a mandatory NSHI for all Kenyans
✓ delegates adopted a resolution to include “right
to health in the constitution” and adopted a task
force report on affordable health care which
recommended the establishment of NSHIF
January 2002 ✓ Cabinet adopted a resolution for the establishment
of NSHIF
May 2002 ✓ Minister of Health established an inter sectoral task
force to prepare a national strategy and Draft bill
expected to lead to the establishment of NSHIF with
its members from government and private sector
✓ A task force completed its work and submitted a
strategy report and a bill to the minister
2003 ✓ Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) for Wealth and
Employment Creation (2003–2007) strategy aimed at
transformation the existing NHIF into a NSHIF
Table 2 Key milestones towards NHI in Kenya (Continued)
June 2003 ✓ MoH approached GTZ/WHO for technical support
with 6th expert mission form June 2003-June 2004 to
support implementation of the scheme once passed
by law
June 2003 ✓ 1st Technical mission which reviewed strategy and
draft bill which led to the draft sessional paper no 2
of 2004
August 2003 ✓ 2nd mission which focused on the legal aspects of
the NSHI bill-benefit package, provider systems,
transition of NHIF-NSHIF
October 2003 ✓ 3rd Mission that focused on the health insurance
management and financial feasibility of the
implementation
January 2004 ✓ 4th mission which focused on the progress
towards implementation change management
process and implementation of the working group
April 2004 ✓ 5th Mission which reviewed progress to formulate
mile stones
June 2004 ✓ 6th Mission on financial projections and trained
Kenyans on financial simulations tool
9th Dec 2004 ✓ Debates in parliament and a bill was passed in
but was not assented by the president on 31st
Dec 2004
Abuya et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:56 Page 5 of 11reducing the administrative costs to 10% for the first
four years.
 The third Technical mission (October- November
2003) focused largely on the financial feasibility of
the NHIS implementation. One key suggestion for
this mission was inclusion of health facility based
preventive services and curative care for both
inpatient and outpatient services. HIV/AIDS and
Tuberculosis were to be included but accounted for
separately.
 The fourth mission set up in January 2004
concentrated on progress toward implementation
of the NHIS, addressing the change management
process and the activities of the NHIF working
groups. It reviewed progress towards
implementation of the NHIS, drafted the final
version of the bill, and explored opportunities
of integrating retirement schemes of armed
forces later.
 The fifth Technical mission conducted between
March and April 2004 aimed at reviewing the
progress on the initial stage of NHIS
implementation and to formulate milestones in the
full implementation.
 The final Technical mission was organized in June
2004. It provided the revised financial projections
through informal discussions with stakeholders
and parliamentary committee on health. The
main set back was the announcement of the
Abuya et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:56 Page 6 of 11introduction of free health care services for all
Kenyans with effect from 1st July 2004. This
reduced the willingness of the informal sector to
contribute to the scheme.
In June 2004 the NHIS bill was tabled in parliament.
The bill sought to establish a mandatory NHIS by July
2004 but the president declined to assent the bill citing
problems related to technical design, affordability, imple-
mentation and sustainability. The bill was returned to
parliament with a memo on the proposed changes¸ but
these were never addressed. Efforts were made to estab-
lish another committee to spearhead the process afresh
in 2007. However, since the previous attempt had polar-
ized key stakeholders, the committee decided to use the
national development blue print as the vehicle for the
health care financing agenda.
“I think the year was to give us a break. Because
when you push something too far, and you do not
succeed, you do not want to start the whole thing too
fast before your enemies have probably disbanded.
We saw that we require one year, for us to rethink
the whole process and probably use another platform
to move the same agenda. And in this case we were
just developing the vision 2030. And one of the
pillars of vision 2030 is having a social health
insurance framework. So we wanted to use the
vision 2030, because remember the initial entry
was the economic recovery strategy, we failed”
(MoH actor).
Overall, the development of NHIS policy was an-
chored on the national development blue print platform
which all government agenda are based on. Despite this,
there has been limited success towards realizing the
NHIS vision.
Stakeholder’s perceptions of the NHIS design
Contribution methods
The proposed sources of financing for the NHIS was the
government through government revenue and earmarked
taxes, the employed (formal sector workers) through pay-
roll harmonization, contributions of employers and the
self-employed as well as donations and grants. Employees
and employers were to contribute on an income-rated
basis while the self-employed were to contribute an afford-
able flat rate. In essence, those working in the formal sec-
tor and their employers were expected to contribute more
than the self-employed. The government was then ex-
pected to contribute for the poor from other sources such
as donations and grants.
Collection of contributions in the formal sector was
based on an assumption that all employers will complywith the obligation to pay their contributions. Measures
to improve compliance were discussed, based on improv-
ing the process of information exchange with business-
registering authorities for registration, and with tax rev-
enue authorities for contribution collection. For the in-
formal sector population, contributions were to be
collected by various organizations close to the popula-
tion. These organizations include cooperatives, welfare
organizations, trade associations and churches. Organi-
zations were to be contracted for this purpose and re-
munerated for collection that they deliver. In addition,
some of these organizations were to be licensed to issue
or stamp the social health insurance card.
Pooling of revenue
There were varied opinions among actors as to whether
the best option was to have single or multiple pools. The
2004 proposal was to re-organize the NHIF as the main
vehicle for the fund rather than setting up a new system.
The proposal drew negative reactions as NHIF had sev-
eral transparency challenges including its administrative
costs. However, most actors noted that it was the only
sensible thing to do then. Arguments against multiple
pools revolved around efficiency and cost of running the
system, while others argued that
“Multiple pools break the solidarity especially in a
small system. For a small country, you need a strong
solidarity element and once you categorize people, you
will have to have a lot of cross subsidies across
different groups” (Donor actor).
There were arguments that a single pool has the ad-
ministrative and logistical problems associated with
monopoly which are linked to inefficiencies if not well
designed. Most of the inefficiencies of the NHIF were as-
sociated with the monopolistic market and there were
fears that the same weaknesses would exist if the NHIS
did not incorporate some elements of competition.
Purchasing
There was an agreement that purchasing health care
through a common pool was a good idea:
“we would want all Kenyans to pull resources into one
pot and use it to finance the health care, for both the
rich and the poor” (MoH Actor).
However, the contentious issues revolved around
whether to have single or multiple purchasers of which
the latter would allow competition:
“There were some people who could not understand
the request from the private sector, so they ended up
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only to realize the implications later” (Treasury actor).
Most players agreed that although the vehicle to imple-
ment the scheme was NHIF, this ought to have waited
until it was restructured:
“NHIF cannot be the same person who is collecting the
money and at the same time utilizing that money”
(NGO Actor).
Some even suggested the need to separate revenue col-
lection and purchasing functions.
Overall, there appeared to be divergent views on the
role of purchasers and providers. Some suggested a sep-
arate body to collect the money and administer it while
a separate body is responsible for purchasing. Separating
these roles is critical for transparency and efficiency.
There was general agreement that purchasers-provider
arrangement should be accompanied by effective regula-
tion and enforcement:
“:…because you realize then you would have about 300
purchasers …. And if they are all doing whatever they
want to do, it will be total chaos; some will be efficient
while others will not” MoH Actor.
Provider payment mechanisms
In terms of provider payment, the design proposed a flat
remuneration rate per inpatient day. For outpatient care,
a flat fee per visit (case payment) was to be paid to pro-
viders. Maximum provider payment levels and special
approval for treatment abroad were also suggested to help
contain costs. The exact remuneration levels were not fi-
nalized but were suggested to be KES 1500–2500 per
inpatient day and KES 100–400 per outpatient visit, based
on selected health facilities. These rates were based on the
assessment of the financial needs reported by Mission and
Government Hospitals with an extra allowance for higher
quality services and infrastructure development. Reduc-
tions in fee levels were considered in the short run if
health facilities cannot provide the full benefit package.
Accreditation of health care providers
Different stakeholders recommended that the design
should have a separate and autonomous department to
conduct accreditation that is independent of the pur-
chaser. That way the primary responsibility of the MoH
will be policy making and divorces itself from service
provision and accreditation. Most stakeholders agreed
that there needs to be a clear set of criteria for accredit-
ing facilities through some form of quasi government
organization that is independent of the revenue collec-
tion and purchasing agencies.Benefit package
The proposed bill generally provided for one minimum
basic package. The package was to cover both outpatient
and inpatient services such as medical consultation, spe-
cialist care, drugs hospitalisation, dental care, referral and
specialised treatment and other benefits as the board may
approve. The main contentious issues were uncertainty of
how HIV and specialised care would be provided. There
were views that there were no actuarial studies done ques-
tioning the sustainability of the scheme:
“....When they talk about management of HIV, there
are so many ways of managing HIV/AIDS. So when
they say renal management, there are so many
elements of renal management, there is the dialysis
and all that. And one episode of dialysis can cost you
a substantial amount of money. But then they say they
can afford that there is still some doubt. And then we
have been asking for some evidence on the actuarial
studies that has informed that benefit package”
(private sector actor).
However actors generally agreed that there needed to
be a minimum package excluding expensive medical
treatments:
“And I think the argument then was that, let’s cluster
this thing into three blocks. One is the primary
healthcare. Things which are social… you know public
goods in nature, and things where the private sector
will not be interested to come in. and you say those
things will be purchased and paid for by the
government; immunization, condoms, you do not want
the private sector to come in just because in the event
that they don’t provide the goods, then the
repercussions will be more than if the government
provided them. Then we look at the secondary level”
(MoH –actor).
Factors influencing the realization of the bill
Cost of implementation
One concern raised as the reason behind failure for the
president to assent to the bill was based on the under-
standing of the implementation, affordability and its im-
plication to the economy. The proposed roll out of the
design in phases was not clearly communicated to key
players. Stakeholders in the finance ministry perceived
that the cost of implementing the scheme was high with
implications to the economy:
“…because they looked at the cost of the entire project
and said it was very expensive, but what they failed to
flag out, is the process of implementing it in stages…
which was part of the design…. so what treasury did is
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coming to around forty billion Kenya shillings, and
said this is too expensive” (MoH actor).
On the other hand, there was a perception that some
government departments deliberately painted the scheme
as expensive to generate apathy among major development
agencies:
“it was almost impossible to know the financial
implications upfront” (Development partner).
The cost of care was also not perceived to be com-
mensurate to the quality of service provided in govern-
ment facilities.
Inadequate communication strategies
A dominating theme was that of inadequate understanding
of the design and how the policy was to be implemented.
This generated misconceptions around the purpose of the
bill and timing as some actors perceived this as an avenue
to provide political mileage to others. Underlying these is-
sues was inadequate communication strategy to articulate
the design, process and the economic implications ad-
equately leading to various “versions of the design” to the
public as was described:
“The only issue is that I blame the political system
that was supposed to connect; the technical people and
the public. This failed us. They didn’t pass the correct
message to the public. You can’t go to Kenyans and
tell them we are going to consume … free healthcare
services. There is always a price for everything. So that
is one area we failed” (MoH actor).
In essence information on the design was “sparingly
provided” leading to patches of the facts that appeared
to generate “uninformed discussions” thought of as de-
liberate attempts to conceal realities of the policy:
“…..I would say there was some element of mischief…
(MoH actor).
Lack of a guided communication strategy generated a
vacuum of factual information flow to various players
partly due to complacency in the part of the government
to take leadership as well as various players within and
outside government departments opposing the bill cov-
ertly as one actor pointed out;
“I can tell you there were people silently… expressing
some discontent about the draft proposal...... If you are
to compare it to some strategies that we have from
other countries, you will realize that ours does notbring out the issues clearly, like the role of the different
organs like NHIF, the role of the private sector and all
that” (MoH Actor).
The public was not enlightened on the key concerns
while the positive aspects were watered down on the
basis of feasibility and cost of implementation.
Fear of implications of the changes
The fear of the implications of changes among the pri-
vate sector on their business threatened support and
success that had been gained up to the passing of the
bill. The immediate response of private sector actors was
the desire to maintain the status quo:
“We have since come through a very big
transformation….what will it mean to our businesses?
So it was a genuine concern” (private sector actor).
The underlying issue was loss of revenue through
outpatient payments made to private health insurance.
The suspicions was based on uncertainty on what the
bill would bring, fuelling and cementing the positions
of the two opposing camps. The dissenting voices
defeated even those in the private sector who were pro
the changes:
“They did not understand how this is going to work
out. We were not seeing each other as players and all
of us have space. … if this system works out then it
means I will lose my…cut!……I will reduce the profits
that I get!” (NGO actor).
Trust, transparency and governance
Underlying the fear described above was mistrust associ-
ated with perceived lack of government’s commitment to
instil transparency and good governance. The perceived
mistrust affected active engagement of all key players
dampening the spirit of collective bargain. Minimal
involvement of the private sector players was inter-
preted as lack of transparency hampering the process of
support. Actors contended that it was important to con-
sider the role of private sector in health care delivery
and financing:
“other non-government players are very strong. So if
you don’t have their backing whether your idea was
good or not it’s likely to fail purely because you did
not involve, it was not participatory, you see?”
(Private sector actor).
Lack of trust on government’s leadership by various
private sector players bred opposition. A number of re-
ports on lack of transparency on the use of NHIF fund
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“And at that time the NHIF was very inefficient, spending
too much money on administration, and we thought in
that Bill we should cut the level of administration costs,
and we put it at 10%. And we also wanted to look into
contribution at a rate of 2.5% per person. So that was not
very contentious but the most contentious issue was this
animal we are giving money, how efficient is the animal
that is now NHIF” (Private sector actor).
The net effect was a blame game among different ac-
tors hiding under “lack of involvement” of a broader set
of key players. Actors expressed mixed feelings about
the engagement with the MoH with some reporting in-
volvement throughout the process:
“And during the preparation, we mobilized all the
stakeholders; Central Organization of Trade Union
(COTU), Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE), private
sector, teachers union… to rally them behind …… what
we thought was a noble objective” (MoH actor).
The private sector actors on the other side reported
scanty initial engagement, although there were efforts to
engage more players post design stage.
Transparency and trust were factors that were linked to
use of public funds collected given the history of NHIF.
Real or perceived mismanagement of funds generated de-
bate on the potential success of the program. Historic ex-
periences and governance context limited acceptability of
design: “We have given you taxes, since we got independ-
ence. Can we see that you have taken care of the assets
that we have given you?” (private sector actor).
International influence
Initially there was support from international actors in-
dicated by their involvement at the design stage. How-
ever, some actors perceived a clash of their role and that
of international programs based on vertical approaches
inherent in the health system. On one hand it was per-
ceived that donors had different priorities that did not
match those of government and that they preferred
funding parallel programs with limited integration if any:
“….you find people concentrating on certain things
that are not the priority of the country.. but these guys
don’t want to hear about health care financing
broadly they are pouring a lot of money may be to
HIV” ( Treasury-actor).“Those vertical programs have an impact but I don’t
think it’s a real impact … I have a feeling that it’s veryprogram oriented, we want to do this, once we are
done, that’s it (Health insurance actor).
Such perceptions, led to doubts over the government’s
ability to finance the project in the absence of donor
funding. Secondly, there was fear among donors that
they may also lose business in various projects once a
comprehensive health care financing strategy is in place:
“There were two issues from the donors. One of the
issues was that ‘if this thing happens, what will be our
role in the health sector? That if the MoH is able to
mobilize ninety billion, and their money (donor
funding) then was about a billion, you know, they have
no role in the health sector. So that was a major fear,
and in fact they used that fear to cause some key
donors to agitate the private sector to campaign
against the social health (private sector actor).
Donors were also uncomfortable with the issue of ac-
cess of services to the poor and how the government will
ensure equity issues are covered. In addition, the design
was criticized for not meeting the international stan-
dards when compared with strategies from other coun-
tries. The bill did not articulate the design issues clearly.
Discussion
This paper aimed to provide a historical account of the
development of a NHIS policy in Kenya, illuminate fac-
tors that led to the failure of its implementation using
retrospective policy analysis, and draw lessons for future
policy design. In the last two decades a number of coun-
tries have implemented NHIS with varying outcomes,
or are in the process of doing so. Rwanda, Burkina Faso,
Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa have either started a na-
tional health insurance program or are in the advanced
stages of starting one [18]. Ghana adopted the NHIS in
2003, which was fully implemented two years later [19],
with relative success in enrollment, utilization, increasing
access to formal services [20,21]. The unique position of
Kenya having not implemented the proposed design
nearly ten years later can help draw out key lessons for
countries which are thinking of formulating NHIS.
First, the consultative process of developing the policy
through expert missions was valuable as it drew from
each other’s recommendations and defined the subse-
quent plan of action. However it lacked a comprehensive
communication strategy to manage the expectations and
reactions of key stakeholders such as organised employer
organisations and private sector. Future reform drivers
may consider developing a stakeholder management
strategy that will provide information to key players dur-
ing the design period. As was observed in the Tanzania
and South African experience, stakeholder management
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gage those against it [22].
This observation brings to fore a number of lessons for
future reform process. Frist, understanding actor’s inter-
ests on specific design elements may facilitate implemen-
tation. For example, key interests instrumental in driving
covert opposition by different players was lack of account-
ability as trails of mistrust by key players was widespread,
a perception fuelled by failure of government to account
for the funds collected through NHIF. This led to the pri-
vate sector players being opposed to collecting revenue
through a public sector authority that pools revenue to a
central fund administered by a government-controlled
body. In retaliation the private sector proposed the need
for competition as critical element in ensuring transpar-
ency and inculcation of spirit of ownership. The second
interest was the profit motive that was threatened by a
wider scheme that would ‘eat’ into actors’ potential “busi-
ness space”. The need for the actor’s understanding of spe-
cific elements of the policy is reflected in the stakeholders’
understanding of the one-time premium policy in Ghana
which led to several misinterpretations [23].
The issue of trust brings in the second lesson where
future proposals should develop a continuous process of
cultivating the spirit of trust over time through govern-
ance structures that promote accountability. Such struc-
tures will attract contributions towards sustainability.
For consumers to enroll in health insurance, they should
trust that insurers use their funds to reimburse providers
who will deliver quality care when needed [24]. Investing
in administrative efficiency and transparency such as use
of efficient electronic system of payment may facilitate
trust. Having proper accountability channels include
mechanisms for members to raise complaints related to
the insurer is also critical. There may be need to rebrand
institutions such as NHIF to enhance trust among con-
tributors. We are cognizant that building trust takes
time but investing in efficient and transparent systems
and effective engagement of stakeholders throughout the
design process is important for acceptability. Develop-
ment partners can play an important role in supporting
restructuring of key institutions to act as drivers for
change. In addition, the widespread perception of poor
quality of services in public health systems, may limit
utilization of services regardless of whether the NHIF is
restructured and a UHC policy put in place. Trust in the
public health system and the government’s ability to pro-
vide services may frustrate any meaningful reforms. Such
opposition may be offset by building efficient service de-
livery structures that are responsive to population needs.
Improving service delivery at all levels of care is a pre-
requisite for making progress towards UHC. Experiences
from Rwanda showed that, managers, providers and pol-
icymakers need to think about a wide range of initiativesthat enhance trust and caring, and to design trust build-
ing structures and practices in the consumer–insur-
ance–provider arrangement [24].
The third lesson is around active sensitization and en-
gagement of key players through a well-organized leader-
ship. Public engagement and encouraging public dialogue
on key issues from the early design stage is key to success.
Although there were divergent views on the nature of
stakeholder engagement during the design stage, it was
clear that the covert opposition due to varied interest ne-
gated the gains made. Engaging the private sector as a
major stakeholder is critical to allow deliberations and dia-
logue, while maintaining leadership and managing con-
flicts at the design stage due to differing interests.
The South African experience is an example of how
stakeholders can derail implementation. Private sector
companies and the divergent views of the governing
party-aligned trade unions that supported a reform
which collects revenue through a public sector authority
and pools this revenue in a central fund administered by
a government-controlled body, were opposed by those
who wanted a managed competition [22].
The fourth lesson is the need to assess specific design
barriers. For example, actors had concerns on some ele-
ments of the design that were linked to cost cutting mea-
sures, efficiency and logistical process of implementation.
Confusion with concepts used in universal coverage re-
forms were also reported in South Africa, with the term
NHIS being used in their health care financing reforms for
a system that has to be largely tax-funded [25]. Finally, fu-
ture reforms process should focus on how to garner sup-
port from large employers by persuading them that the
proposals would reduce their workforce costs. The win-
win situation is critical for future implementation.
This study had a number of limitations. The study is
limited by its retrospective nature which may not cap-
ture all relevant issues. In addition, the views may not be
universal of all stakeholders since we could not interview
the entire set of actors involved as some of them had left
their previous positions and were not willing to partici-
pate. Thirdly, the study only focuses on the policy design
and formulation phase which limits us from drawing les-
sons from literature as most studies assess the effect of
implementing NHIS. Few have examined stakeholder
perceptions of the design at inception such as those
from Ghana which focus on challenges of implementa-
tion process [26], while studies from Nigeria and Ghana,
show the effect of NHIS on health indicators [27].
Conclusion
The Kenyan experience shows that the thrust towards
UHC over the last decade was affected by the complex
interaction of actors’ understanding of the design, inad-
equate management of the process and the covert
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tors whose interests were not catered for. Future reforms
in health care financing towards UHC in Kenya, should
not only focus on the design of a viable national health
insurance but also devise ways of building trust to exist-
ing health care systems, the public and institutions man-
dated to provide leadership in the reform process.
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